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The Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational




This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation
can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned
as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward
through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this
fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenera-
tional equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each
suggest, however, that the modern embrace of "shareholder value" as
the only corporate objective and "shareholder democracy" as the ideal
of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form's ability to
serve this economically and ethically important function.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are mortal creatures; we grow old and die. That hard truth car-
ries a number of fundamental implications about the nature and objec-
tives of individual human beings. It also carries a number of fundamental
implications about the nature and objectives of an entity that (unlike hu-
man beings) need not grow old and die: the corporation.
This Symposium Article explores the possibility that mortal persons
use the corporate entity to transport wealth between different time peri-
ods in two different ways. First, as a legal entity with the capacity to own
assets in its own name, the corporation allows human persons to transfer
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resources to the corporate entity and make them unavailable for current
consumption ("asset lock-in") so that the resources can be instead invest-
ed in projects that generate wealth in later time periods. This future
wealth may be consumed by the human persons who originally commit-
ted resources to the corporate entity. But the future wealth generated by a
corporation with perpetual life can also be consumed by a future genera-
tion of human beings. Thus the corporate form offers not only a useful
savings and investment technology for individuals seeking to serve their
own interests, but also a vehicle for the present generation to altruistical-
ly pass resources forward through time to benefit those who will live in
the future.
Second, some types of corporations-in particular, public business
corporations with freely transferable shares traded on a reasonably effi-
cient market-can transform wealth that will be generated in the future
into wealth that can be enjoyed today in the form of a higher share price.
This means the corporate form can be used not only to create future
wealth to benefit future generations, but also to shift wealth backward in
time to benefit earlier generations. This allows a kind of implicit ex-
change between those who live presently and those who will live in the
future, rewarding the present generation of shareholders for preserving
resources and making investments that benefit future generations.
The public business corporation with asset lock-in, perpetual life,
and freely transferable shares, accordingly, is a legal technology that can
play, and historically has played, an important role in promoting both
intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. However, the
recent rise of a "shareholder value"-focused approach to understanding
and governing public corporations has begun to erode public companies'
abilities to lock in their assets. Logic and evidence both suggest this loss
of asset lock-in is threatening the public corporation's ability to serve as
a mechanism for transferring wealth between time periods and genera-
tions.
Part II of this Symposium Article describes how corporate entities
can be understood as institutions designed to transfer wealth forward
from earlier time periods to later time periods. Part III explains how the
process can work in reverse, with public business corporations in particu-
lar shifting wealth from the future to the present. Part III also explains
how this backwards time-shifting encourages the current generation to
preserve and invest resources in a fashion that serves both intergenera-
tional equity and intergenerational efficiency. Part IV offers some
thoughts and evidence on the destructive consequences of the contempo-
rary shareholder value approach to corporations and corporate govern-
ance. Part V concludes.
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II. How CORPORATIONS SHIFT WEALTH FROM THE PRESENT TO THE
FUTURE
A. On the Need for a Savings/Investment Technology
One of the many problems we face as humans is our need for a sav-
ings technology. Most of us are productive in youth and middle age and
generate wealth beyond what we need for immediate consumption. But if
we are lucky enough to escape disease and accident, we may live past the
point where we can easily provide for our own needs. Moreover, even in
youth and middle age, we see both fat years and lean. We need a tech-
nology to preserve (and ideally increase) the excess wealth we generate
in good times so that it can be available to us in bad years and in our de-
cline.1
Unfortunately, a good savings technology is hard to find. Primitive
populations did their best to preserve meat and grain. But smoked meat
and stored grain eventually rot. Today, many of us store wealth in fiat
money or (for the more nervous) precious metals. Unfortunately, these
are also flawed saving strategies, as inflation typically eats away the val-
ue of what we have saved, as surely as mold and mice eventually destroy
2wheat in a granary.
To preserve and (better yet) increase saved resources, we must in-
vest those resources and put them to work in some endeavor that gener-
ates future returns. A Roman farmer, for example, might plant olive trees
to bear fruit to sustain him in his old age. But this is investment on a rela-
tively modest scale.
B. The Corporation as Savings/Investment Technology That Locks In
Assets
By allowing individuals to aggregate their resources and invest
them collectively, corporations allow people to pursue saving/investment
projects much larger than planting an orchard. Through aggregation in a
corporate entity, individuals of modest means can accumulate enormous
sums of capital that can be devoted to enormous ventures that promise
1. Saving and investing is one strategy for ensuring that one has access to resources in hard
times or after one's productivity has declined. Another strategy is to rely on altruism-the kindness
of one's family or community or even, in the fashion of Blanche DuBois, the kindness of strangers.
However, the empirical evidence generally suggests that human altruism is limited. See infra notes
39-40 (discussing altruism). Thus, a good savings/investment technology remains highly desirable.
2. Central banks typically try to maintain a modest degree of inflation to avoid any risk of
deflation, which is viewed as far more dangerous. See Rick Newman, Why Deflation is Worse Than
Inflation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 16, 2010, 10:16 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/
blogs/flowchart/2010/07/16/why-deflation-is-worse-than-inflation.
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even more enormous returns. They can build railroads and manufacturing
plants or create banks and pharmaceutical businesses. Thus the invention
of the corporate entity increased the number and types of projects indi-
vidual persons could undertake in their quest to invest resources for fu-
ture consumption.
3
But there are other legal technologies, beyond the corporate form,
that aggregate wealth. Partnerships in particular also permit aggregation.
To understand the unique advantages of the corporate entity4 as a sav-
ings/investment technology, we must focus on an attribute of the corpo-
rate form that partnerships typically lack: the ability to lock in resources
contributed by shareholders.
My coauthor Margaret Blair has used the phrase "lock-in" to de-
scribe how corporate assets, because they are the property of the corpo-
rate entity and not its shareholders, cannot be easily withdrawn from the
entity, even when a shareholder or group of shareholders wants to do
this.5 Put simply, once you use your money to purchase stock in a com-
pany, your money becomes the company's money. You have no legal
power to demand it back.
On first inspection, asset lock-in seems a disadvantage. It raises a
number of potential problems, including the risk that locked-in assets
will be kept inside the corporation even when they could be put to better
use elsewhere. 6 As discussed further below, however, asset lock-in also
offers economic advantages by making it possible for corporate entities
3. Because borrowing allows the borrower to obtain money now in exchange for payment later,
the debtor/creditor relationship similarly can be viewed as an innovative savings technology, albeit a
relatively ancient one. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5000 YEARS (2011).
4. This category can include the business form known as the limited liability company or LLC.
See infra note 7 (discussing LLCs).
5. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003). Corporations can lock in assets
because unlike traditional partnerships, they own assets in their own names. Shareholders are enti-
tled only to dividends, which are paid only when the board of directors declares a dividend and the
law permits the dividend to be paid. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 292 (1999).
However, when a corporation has a controlling shareholder, that controlling shareholder may have
the functional ability to gain access to the corporation's assets by virtue of her power to easily re-
place the members of the board of directors. Thus, corporations with controlling shareholders have
less capacity for asset lock-in. Id. at 319; see also infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing corporations with controlling shareholders).
It should also be noted that corporate "stakeholders" like employees or executives sometimes ac-
quire substantial power to extract corporate assets for their own benefit. Excessive stakeholder pow-
er to extract corporate assets can also defeat lock in and threatens the corporation's ability to pursue
long-term projects. See infra note 91 (discussing decline of the U.S. auto industry due to unionized
employee demands).
6. See infra notes 60, 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs).
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(a category that today includes many LLCs)' to pursue long-term eco-
nomic projects under uncertain conditions-projects that otherwise could
not succeed.
C. A Caveat on the Availability of Asset Lock-In: Not All Corporations
Are Alike
Before considering the possible economic advantages of asset lock-
in, it should be pointed out that while all corporations hold assets in their
own names, and while shareholders generally lack legal access to corpo-
rate assets,8 in certain kinds of corporations some shareholders, as a prac-
tical matter, can unlock corporate assets and take those assets for them-
selves.9 In particular, it is much harder to lock assets into a corporation
that has a controlling shareholder. A controlling shareholder enjoys indi-
rect power to extract corporate assets because she can easily remove and
replace the company's board of directors if they do not follow her in-
structions. Only as directors become independent of shareholders does
asset lock-in become possible.' 0
7. An LLC can be structured today to function very much like a traditional corporation, with
perpetual life, capital lock-in, and free transferability of shares. Thus, some LLCs are the functional
equivalents of close corporations, with the only significant difference being tax consequences (LLCs
have the option to "check the box" and receive partnership tax treatment, so they are not subject to
income tax at the level of the entity). However, an LLC whose shares are listed for trading on a
recognized exchange loses the option of pass-through tax treatment, which is the primary distinction
between an LLC and a corporation-becoming a public corporation in all but name. See 26 U.S.C. §
7704 (2014).
8. Owning shares in Apple does not entitle you to help yourself to the wares in an Apple store.
Shareholders may only access corporate assets by receiving dividends or selling their shares back to
the firm. Moreover, dividends and share repurchases are controlled not by shareholders, but by the
board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 160, 170 (2014).
9. In other words, simply creating a corporate entity is not sufficient to achieve lock-in.
10. As this sentence implies, asset lock-in is not a binary characteristic. Corporate entities can
be viewed as falling along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, nonprofit corporations with no
shareholders have an extreme degree of asset lock-in. At the other end of the spectrum, a corporation
with only one shareholder who can easily remove the board has very little lock-in unless that sole
shareholder is prevented from withdrawing corporate assets by other constraints, for example debt
covenants that limit dividends and share repurchases.
Most corporate entities fall somewhere between these two extremes on the lock-in spectrum. For
example, a publicly traded firm with disbursed share ownership and strong antitakeover protections
has a high degree of lock-in, as it is difficult or impossible for shareholders to demand cash from the
corporation through dividends, share repurchases, or the sale of the firm.
Put differently, as Blair and I explained in detail in the article that is the subject of this Symposi-
um, a greater degree of board control increases a corporate entity's ability to lock in its assets be-
cause the board is free to act as a "mediating hierarch" precluded by law from taking the corporate
entity's assets for its own benefit. Unlike shareholders, a board structured to act like a mediating
hierarch does not benefit from unlocking corporate assets before the corporation's long-term goals
have been achieved. Placing control of the firm in the hands of a board can thus increase the odds of
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In the United States today, the vast majority of corporate entities
(again, this category includes many LLCs) are small firms whose shares
are not traded on an exchange. Many of these small entities may have a
controlling shareholder. In such cases, the entity's capacity to lock in
assets is questionable, and its ability to pursue long-term projects de-
pends on the patience and dedication of the shareholder in question.
However, even if many (perhaps most) corporate entities cannot
lock in assets, some especially important kinds of corporations can. The-
se include nonprofit corporations that have no shareholders; private
companies with multiple shareholders who share control;" and the ca-
nonical public company with widely disbursed share ownership, espe-
cially if that public company has takeover defenses that make it unlikely
to acquire a controlling shareholder. Control over the assets of these enti-
ties rests mostly in the hands of boards of directors. And board-
controlled entities, while perhaps fewer than corporations with a control-
ling shareholder, account for far more economically important firms, in-
cluding all major nonprofits and most Fortune 500 companies. Nor is this
a coincidence. Only entities that can aggregate resources from many in-
dividuals and then lock in and preserve those resources for long periods
of time are likely to survive to grow to enormous size.
The predictable outcome is that corporations with a high degree of
board control, and so a high degree of lock-in, play disproportionately
important roles in our economy and our society. The remainder of this
Symposium Article focuses on the economic functions of corporations
with effective asset lock-in.
D. Asset Lock-In Encourages Investment by Protecting Shareholders
from Each Other
Let us first consider an important but counterintuitive advantage of
locking assets into a corporate entity: it encourages aggregated invest-
ment by reducing shareholders' risk that they will harm each other. To
the corporation's long-term survival. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 284-85 (discussing idea of
board as mediating hierarch).
1I. Most corporate statutes once required corporations to have three or more shareholders,
essentially mandating some degree of board control and asset lock-in as a prerequisite for employing
the corporate form. IA WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 88 (2010). Modem statutes often allow corporations to be formed with a single
shareholder. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2011). The fact that corporations with a single share-
holder lack equity aggregation or board control raises the question of what economic function incor-
poration serves in such cases. Limited shareholder liability that encourages risk taking seems the
obvious answer. See infra note 45 (discussing shareholder limited liability as an explanation for the
rise of the corporate form).
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understand that risk, imagine a railroad company that lacked asset lock-
in, so that each shareholder could withdraw her proportionate interest in
the railroad's assets at any time, just as partners can withdraw their inter-
est from a partnership. Such a railroad would be constantly exposed to
the danger that a significant shareholder might demand the return of her
interest. Unless the railroad happened to have a lot of cash on hand, it
might be forced to sell essential assets to meet such a demand, destroying
the value of the enterprise. And, as Blair has explained, shareholders
might very well make such demands, either because they suddenly find
themselves in need of cash or, more opportunistically, because they hope
making a demand that threatens the enterprise will give them leverage to
extract valuable concessions from their fellow shareholders.' 2 Alterna-
tively, as Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have pointed out, the
creditors of a shareholder who becomes insolvent might make similar
claims.
13
The corporate entity's capacity to aggregate and lock in assets and
insulate them from the demands of shareholders (or shareholders' credi-
tors) accordingly gives board-controlled corporations an important ad-
vantage as a savings/investment technology. Unlike partnerships, which
can be destroyed by the death, withdrawal, or bankruptcy of any one of
the partners,' 4 corporations can "stay the course" and pursue large-scale,
long-term projects under uncertain conditions without fearing their equi-
ty investors might become opportunistic, impatient, or insolvent. This
encourages shareholders to invest in collective enterprises by protecting
shareholders from each other, expanding the range of economic projects
individuals can pursue in their quest to ensure they have access to wealth
in the future.
E. Asset Lock-In Also Encourages Stakeholder Investment by Protecting
Stakeholders from Shareholders
In the 1999 article that is the subject of this Symposium, 15 Blair and
I explored how creating a board-controlled corporation with asset lock-in
does more than protect shareholders from each other. It also offers a se-
12. Blair, supra note 5, at 401.
13. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 394 (2000).
14. The death or withdrawal of a partner (including withdrawal due to insolvency) typically
ends a general partnership. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1914). Some partnership agreements ensure the
partnership continues by providing that the remaining partners must purchase the interests of any
partner who leaves. Id. § 38. This solution only works when the remaining partners have the re-
sources to purchase the ex-partner's interest.
15. Blair & Stout, supra note 5.
2015]
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cond economic advantage by protecting important corporate stakehold-
ers' 6-employees, customers, suppliers, creditors-from the corpora-
tion's shareholders. What's more, Blair and I argued, protecting stake-
holders this way, while sometimes costly to shareholders ex post, actual-
ly may provide greater benefits to shareholders ex ante by promoting
what economists call "team production."
To understand this somewhat counterintuitive idea, consider again
the case of a corporation founded to build a railroad, as many early busi-
ness corporations were founded to do. Once the railroad's assets are
locked into a board-controlled corporate entity, shareholders cannot easi-
ly withdraw their financial contributions. This may prove a serious in-
convenience to the railroad's shareholders ex post, should they want or
need to convert their interest to cash. But it also makes it far safer for the
corporate entity to convert shareholders' financial contributions to rail-
road-"specific" assets, like track or rights-of-way,17 and makes the com-
pany's survival more likely.' 8 This encourages important stakeholders to
make their own finn-specific investments: customers become willing to
buy houses along the railroad and use it for their daily commute; em-
ployees become willing to acquire skills of unique value to the railroad
as an employer; and communities become willing to build infrastructure
along the line to support and attract businesses that will use the railroad.
These railroad-specific stakeholder investments contribute to the enter-
prise's success. Asset lock-in, by protecting stakeholders from the risk
that shareholders will try to withdraw assets from the corporate "team,"
ultimately benefits shareholders as well.' 9
16. This Symposium Article uses the word "stakeholder" to refer to nonshareholder groups that
contribute valuable resources (labor, expertise, financing, infrastructure) to support corporate opera-
tions. There may be groups that do not contribute to the company's success that nevertheless are
affected by the corporation's actions. For example, a corporation that pollutes may harm parties with
no other relationship to the firm. For clarity, this Symposium Article will not use the word stake-
holders to describe such groups, but instead employs the phrase "corporate externalities" to describe
situations where the corporation imposes costs on or provide benefits to parties who otherwise have
no relationship with the firm.
17. In the parlance of economics, a resource is described as specific to a particular project
when it cannot be withdrawn from the project and sold on the market without losing much of its
value. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 272 n.51 (discussing asset specificity).
18. Corporate survival is more likely when corporate assets are controlled by a board of direc-
tors because directors are precluded by the fiduciary duty of loyalty from taking corporate assets for
themselves. Shareholders in contrast are permitted to receive corporate assets distributed through
dividends, share repurchase programs, and liquidations. See supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing shareholders' incentives to unlock corporate assets).
19. Because the assets of a corporation with a controlling shareholder are not well locked-in,
see supra text accompanying note 10, this raises the question of how such corporations attract spe-
cific investments from stakeholders. Blair and I suspect interpersonal trust between stakeholders and
controlling shareholders may provide part of the answer. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 302
2015] The Corporation As a Time Machine
As this example illustrates, and as Blair and [ explored in our 1999
article, recognizing stakeholders' specific investments reinforces how
dangerously misleading it can be to describe the shareholders of a board-
controlled company that is being operated rather than liquidated as the
sole "residual claimants" in the corporation.2 0 An operating corporation
as a matter of law is its own residual claimant, and the board of a public
company typically enjoys a wide range of discretion to decide which of
many corporate constituencies benefits from, or is harmed by, corporate
actions and decisions. 21 Boards might use their control over corporate
assets to pay shareholders more or fewer dividends, but they might also
give employees more or fewer raises and benefits, provide customers
better or worse products and service, give executives greater or lesser job
security and luxury perquisites, force creditors to bear more or less risk,
and pay governments more or less in taxes.22
By emphasizing how taking account of stakeholders' interests ulti-
mately benefits shareholders, team production analysis supports stake-
holder theorists who have long argued that corporations are run well and
contribute most to society when directors pay attention to corporate con-
stituencies beyond equity investors.23 But team production theory also, as
will be discussed later on, carries some interesting implications for how
corporate entities transmute the relationship between present and future
(discussing close corporations); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (discussing trust in
corporations).
20. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 263. The problem of external costs provides an additional
argument against viewing shareholders as the only parties that benefit from or are harmed by the
board's business decisions.
21. Id.; See also LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
22. As an example of how governments are affected by corporate policies, consider the current
debate over the decisions of several U.S. companies to avoid paying American corporate tax by
pursuing "inversion" transactions that result in their becoming foreign companies. See David Gelles,
Senate Panel Takes on Tax Inversions, BOSTON GLOBE (July 23, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.combusiness/2014/07/22/senate-panel-takes-tax-inversions/kiSzBQQkvK
4N7nbxdKsmQl/story.html.
23. There is a longstanding debate among corporate scholars over whether corporations should
be run to serve only the interests of shareholders (the dominant shareholder primacy approach, see
infra Part IV.A), or whether they should also serve the interests of stakeholder groups like employ-
ees, customers, creditors, and society, see generally H. Jeff Smith, The Shareholders vs. Stakehold-
ers Debate, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., no. 4, Summer 2003, at 85, available at
http://sloanreview.MIT.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate. This Symposium Article
does not take a position beyond noting that once one recognizes that shareholders are not the only
group affected by corporate decisions, see STOUT, supra note 21, at 4-6, stakeholder theorists would
seem to have the intellectual high ground. Rather, this Symposium Article focuses on the particular
problem of creating efficient incentives for the current generation (whether of shareholders or of
shareholders and stakeholders) to set aside and invest resources to benefit future generations.
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generations. These include implications about how corporations can ben-
efit future stakeholders as well as future shareholders, and implications
about how present-day stakeholders as well as present-day shareholders
can put these future benefits at risk by seeking to unlock corporate as-
sets.24
F. Now, Add Perpetual Existence
Corporations, as we have seen, can not only aggregate assets but
can also lock those assets in against shareholders' (or, for that matter,
stakeholders') demands. As we have also just seen, asset lock-in encour-
ages shareholders and stakeholders alike to make specific investments in
corporate production. These advantages of using the corporate form help
explain why board-controlled corporate entities, both for-profit and non-
profit, have emerged as such important forces in our economy today. (Of
course, placing control over corporate assets in the hands of a board ra-
ther than the corporation's shareholders or stakeholders raises its own
problems. Part III discusses the issue of managerial "agency costs" in
greater detail.) 25
There may be another reason, however, why board-controlled cor-
porations have come to play such a central role in our economic system.
So far, the analysis has focused, at least implicitly, on how corporate en-
tities serve the interests of shareholders and stakeholders who are alive
today. This focus is typical of most contemporary corporate scholarship,
including much of my own.26 (After all, it is only the living whom we
can see: out of sight, out of mind.) Yet the understandable human ten-
dency to focus on the welfare of those living today when analyzing insti-
tutions may distract us from perceiving what may be the most important
function of the corporate form. This function is hinted at when we con-
sider another fundamental characteristic of corporate entities: perpetual
life.27
24. For simplicity, the discussion here will focus primarily on the relationship between the
current generation of shareholders deciding whether to keep assets locked into a corporate entity,
and future generations of shareholders who might benefit from such commitments. But see infra
notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing how corporations can benefit future stakeholders)
and supra note 5 (discussing how stakeholders can threaten to unlock corporate assets, just as share-
holders can).
25. See infra Part Ill.
26. For an interesting recent exception, see Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764 (2012) (arguing that the corporate characteristic of perpetual life obliges
managers to invest for a perpetual future, adopting long time horizons and low discount rates).
27. Two other characteristics often associated with corporate entities are limited liability and
centralized management. See supra note 7 and infra note 45 for a discussion of these characteristics.
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Unlike a human being, a corporation need not grow old and die. At
least in theory, it can exist in perpetuity. 28 The remainder of this Sympo-
sium Article considers how the corporate entity's capacity to lock in as-
sets may have even more interesting, and possibly more important, im-
plications when considered in combination with the corporation's capaci-
ty to exist in perpetuity. As we have seen, asset lock-in allows corpora-
tions to pursue long-term economic projects that sole proprietorships and
partnerships cannot. This expands the menu of savings/investment op-
tions available to human beings hoping to make wealth available to their
future selves. But in addition to serving as a superior savings/investment
technology for the present generation, the corporation can also preserve
resources for, and pursue projects whose benefits will only be enjoyed
by, future generations. Indeed, history suggests this is why many of the
first corporations were created.
G. Intergenerational Equity and How Corporations Can Preserve and
Grow Resources for Future Generations
Human beings are mortal, but human beings also reproduce. Each
generation is replaced by another. This reality of our existence as biolog-
ical organisms raises a number of significant issues. One is the question
of equity between generations.
What obligations do the present generation owe to future genera-
tions? A full discussion of this difficult ethical issue lies well beyond the
scope of this Symposium Article. But I take as my starting point that the
present generation has some obligation to consider the welfare of those
who come after us. Quite apart from efficiency concerns, most of us
think it inequitable for the people who happen to be alive this moment to
take for themselves all that can possibly be extracted from our economic,
social, and ecological systems, and leave behind a burnt cinder.
Yet even if most people agree that equity demands we leave some-
thing behind for future generations, economic theory teaches that, collec-
tively, we find it difficult to fulfill that ethical obligation. From the per-
spective of the individual, the ethical desire to leave resources for future
generations presents a classic "tragedy of the commons., 29 The individu-
28. More accurately, a corporation can exist "in sempitemity," meaning that while the corpora-
tion is not eternal (having no beginning nor end in time), it is created and so has a beginning in time,
but thereafter no end in time. See David Ciepley, The Corporate Roots of the Liberal Democratic
State 26 (July 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author) (discussing corporate
sempiternity).
29. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. MAG. 1243 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/i62/3859/1243.full.
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al who abstemiously refrains from consuming every resource he can lay
his hands on during his lifetime will, on the margin, accomplish little
more than to reduce his own welfare. Someone else, either in this genera-
tion or in the next, will selfishly take what he does not.
Altruism toward those who will live in the future, like other forms
of charity, is a public good that will be underprovided absent interven-
tion. To preserve resources and invest in projects that benefit future gen-
erations, we need some mechanism to take the decision whether to con-
sume or invest away from the individual.
One obvious mechanism is a coercive state. From the days of the
Pharaohs and the pyramids, states have played important roles in promot-
ing large-scale, long-term enterprises. But government has its limits as a
mechanism for protecting the interests of future generations. As both
democracy and capitalism have spread, the ability of states to protect the
interests of those not yet born has become, if anything, more questiona-
ble. Capitalism, with its emphasis on private ordering, discourages state
intervention in economic production. And democracy strongly privileges
the interests of the current generation of voters over the interest of voters
not yet born. 30 Thus it seems worthwhile to pay some attention to a se-
cond possible way to take the decision to consume or to invest resources
away from the individual: create a corporation.
H. Perpetual Life Makes the Corporation a Technology for Preserving
and Transferring Resources to Future Generations
Corporate perpetual life has important consequences. Most obvi-
ously, unlike a mortal human being, a corporate entity gains no ad-
vantage from consuming its resources within a relatively brief time
frame. It can afford to be patient. This makes corporations ideal institu-
tions for pursuing long-term projects whose benefits will not be realized
until well after the current cohort of human beings has ceased to exist.
In fact, preserving resources and pursuing long-term projects for fu-
ture generations were exactly what some of the earliest corporations-
among them townships, universities, and monasteries-were created to
do. It was a corporate entity, the Veneranda Fabbrica del Duomo di Mi-
30. In less democratic systems, despots and aristocrats whose material needs are well satisfied
might be more inclined to pursue future-oriented projects that allow them to leave an altruistic lega-
cy than the typical voter whose focus may be on meeting immediate needs. The spread of political
democracy around the globe may be making it more difficult for states to invest for the future, just as
this Symposium Article argues the spread of shareholder democracy may be making it more difficult
for public corporations to invest for the future. See infra text accompanying notes 93, 107 (discuss-
ing shareholder democracy).
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lano, that began building-and is still completing-the Cathedral of Mi-
lan, a project that has spanned thirty human generations.3" Similarly,
when Oxford University's New College was first founded in 1379, the
college dining hall was built using massive oak beams to hold up the roof
because oak is a long-lasting timber. 32 Only hundreds of years later did
the oak beams begin to give out.33 New College was able to obtain new
oak to rebuild the dining hall without difficulty because hundreds of
years earlier it had acquired a grove of oak trees, which it had kept and
allowed to grow to maturity.
34
Such examples illustrate how corporate entities can surpass mere
human beings in their ability to plan and implement projects whose bene-
fits will be reaped decades, even centuries, after the project is begun.
This capacity to benefit future generations is perhaps most obvious in the
case of nonprofit corporate entities like the Fabbrica and New College, or
to use examples of corporations created more recently, the Nature Con-
servancy and Cornell University. But for-profit corporate entities also
have perpetual life.
History offers many examples of how, under the right circumstanc-
es, for-profit corporate entities can also preserve resources and pursue
projects that benefit future generations. During the 1950s and 1960s, it
was common for large public corporations such as IBM, AT&T, DuPont,
Kodak, and Xerox to operate research laboratories devoted to pure sci-
ence. These laboratories produced a wealth of inventions and innovations
whose benefits we still enjoy, including the transistor, the laser, the solar
cell, the ATM, the copying machine, and the digital camera.35 Today,
31. The Fabbrica was created in 1387 by the governor of Milan. The original administrative
board included most of the notable Milanese authorities of the time, including the duke of Milan.
Today the board has six members and a president. VENERANDA FABBRICA DEL DUOMO DI MILANO,
THE CHARTER OF VENERANDA FABBRICA (2013), available at
http://www.duomomilano.it/en/infopage/the-charter-of-veneranda-fabbrica/7ec4fd2b-304e-4955-
987c-038b43da02c8/. Architects use the phrase "cathedral thinking" to describe projects that bring
together the efforts of many different individuals over long periods of time to accomplish a socially
beneficial objective that may not be realized until well into the future. Fareed Zakaria, 'Cathedral
Thinking', NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2007, at 48. Put simply, this Symposium Article argues that the
corporate form is a vital legal technology for promoting cathedral thinking.
32. Jennifer Thorpe, New College's Hall and Chapel Roofs (May 2008) (unpublished essay)
(on file with author).
33. Id.
34. Although in some versions of this story the founder of New College planted the oak grove,
a 2008 essay by the New College archivist states that the oak for the hall was harvested from wood-
lands acquired by the college seventy years after the hall was first built (but centuries before they
were used for repairs). Id.
35. See generally DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION:
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA (1999) (discussing the role of corporations,
along with governments and universities, in fostering innovation in the United States).
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Google is pursuing pure research in robotics. 36 While I may never benefit
from the services of a personal robot, my children surely will.
The corporate form accordingly can serve, and historically has
served, as a mechanism that allows present generations to preserve and
invest resources to benefit future generations.37 To the extent that the
people alive at any moment in time feel altruism toward the people they
expect will follow them, the corporate form provides a vehicle to better
express their generosity.
38
III. How PUBLIC BUSINESS CORPORATIONS CAN SHIFT WEALTH FROM
THE FUTURE TO THE PRESENT
A. Present Generations Lack Sufficient Incentive to Invest Efficiently for
Future Generations
Unfortunately, while members of the present generation can use
corporate entities to preserve and invest resources to benefit future gen-
erations, this does not mean they will. After all, why should they? They
bear the cost, while the benefits will be enjoyed by others not yet born,
who cannot even say "thank you."
The decision to commit resources to a nonprofit corporation to pre-
serve and invest for future generations requires altruism. As I have ex-
36. See Jonathan Berr, Google Buys 8 Robotics Companies in 6 Months: Why?,
CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 16, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-buys-8-robotics-
companies-in-6-months-why/.
37. Another legal technology that permits present-day altruists to benefit future generations is
the charitable trust. Although the tax advantages associated with creating a trust reduce the cost of
altruism, they do not make it costless. In this regard, the public corporation with freely transferable
shares may be a superior vehicle for promoting investment on behalf of future generations. See infra
text accompanying note 53-59 (discussing how public corporations created incentives for the present
generation to invest for the future).
38. Creating a corporation encourages altruism by reducing the risk an altruistic donor's con-
tributions will be expropriated by others after the donor dies. Because the donor's contribution is
locked into a legal entity controlled by a board whose members are precluded by the duty of loyalty
from taking the entity's assets for themselves, the entity becomes more likely to pursue the cause for
which it was created and less likely to be hijacked to serve the interests of some individual. Howev-
er, other obstacles to collective altruism remain. For example, the availability of the corporate form
does not solve the problem of free-riding altruists who prefer to rely on the donations of others.
Einer Elhauge has advanced the somewhat different argument that board governance encourages
corporations to behave in a more altruistic and socially responsible fashion, because board members
have better access than disbursed shareholders do to information about the corporation's social per-
formance, and also are more easily targeted and shamed when corporations behave irresponsibly.
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733
(2005).
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plored elsewhere, altruism is a real and common phenomenon.3 9 The
human capacity for altruism appears limited, however.4" As an empirical
matter, few individuals are selfless Mother Theresas willing to entirely
subordinate their needs to serve others. As a result, even when the corpo-
rate form is available, the present generation likely will have only limited
willingness to use it to lock away resources. This raises problems not
only of intergenerational equity, but also of intergenerational efficiency.
To understand the efficiency problem, imagine a long-term pro-
ject-say, devising a clean energy source or a means of dramatically ex-
tending the human lifespan-that requires a large investment now but
may produce enormous returns decades or centuries hence.4' The ex-
pected gains from the project are so great that, even discounting future
financial returns to present value and accounting for the possibility of
failure,4 2 investing in the project is efficient. Unfortunately, mortal per-
sons who cannot expect to live long enough to reap the benefits of in-
vesting in the project are unlikely to make the sacrifice necessary to pur-
sue it.
For example, suppose that investing $100 billion in research today
would allow us to develop a technology for clean, cheap energy. Such a
technology would benefit future generations for centuries to come. The
expected future benefits of the research can be valued in trillions of dol-
lars, even after discounting to present value and for risk of failure. In
other words, the investment is efficient: its expected benefits substantial-
ly outweigh its costs. Nevertheless, the research is only likely to produce
a commercially viable technology after forty years. This is well beyond
the investing lifetime of most potential investors, as most people do not
accumulate wealth to invest until middle age, and begin liquidating their
39. See generally LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE (2011).
40. Id.
41. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Solow has famously argued, this sort of innova-
tion and technological change is critical in driving economic growth. See generally Robert M.
Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312
(1957).
42. Economists generally discount the value of future monetary benefits to reflect the time
value of money (money received today has greater value than money that will be received in the
future, because money received today can be invested to generate a return). However, experts debate
whether nonmonetary benefits that will be enjoyed in the future should be discounted. For example,
when choosing between adding to the life expectancy of someone who is alive today, and adding to
the life expectancy of someone who will live one hundred years from now, it is not clear that life
expectancy increases in the future should be assigned a lower value. See William Nordhous, The
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 12741, 2006), available at http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/nordhausonstem
w12741 .pdf (discussing this issue).
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investments when they retire in their sixties and seventies. Accordingly,
such an investment might not be made.
Although the corporation provides a legal technology for pursuing
economically desirable but long-term enterprises, the availability of this
technology, alone, does not motivate present generations to pursue such
enterprises. If the people currently living are less than perfectly altruis-
tic-if they value their own welfare more than they value the welfare of
those who will populate the planet after they die-present generations
will invest for the future at suboptimal levels and fail to pursue many
projects whose future benefits greatly outweigh their present costs. From
an economic perspective, the resulting failure to invest for the future is
inefficient.43
B. Now, Add Freely Transferable Shares and (Somewhat) Efficient
Pricing
Here is where a third characteristic commonly associated with cer-
tain types of corporations-in particular, with public business corpora-
tions of the sort described by Berle and Means in their 1932 treatise, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property"-comes into play. This
third characteristic is the free transferability of shares.
Like asset lock-in and perpetual life, free transferability of shares is
an important, if not necessarily universal,45 characteristic of business
43. Although economic theory is often associated with the celebration of selfishness, econom-
ics is a fundamentally communitarian philosophy that focuses on maximizing social welfare rather
than the welfare of any individual. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 1I, 14-16 (1992) (discussing efficiency and social welfare).
In maximizing social welfare, nothing in economic theory confines the inquiry to the present genera-
tion.
44. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
45. Perpetual life and lock-in are not found in all corporations, because lock-in can be defeated
by a controlling shareholder, and corporations can be chartered for limited periods or terminated by
bankruptcy, merger, or dissolution. Similarly, two other characteristics associated with the corporate
form, centralized management and limited liability for shareholders, are not universal. A corporation
may have a controlling shareholder who manages the firm, and limited liability for shareholders can
be waived by agreement-and in any case is a relatively new attribute of the corporate form. See
Mark Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 1928-1931: It's the Lawyers, 7 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 439 (2005) (limited shareholder liability was not a feature of California corporations until well
into the twentieth century, and when added by statute did not appear to affect the market price of
California firms).
For present purposes, centralized professional management and limited shareholder liability are
important corporate characteristics primarily because they support asset lock in and free transferabil-
ity of shares. A corporation managed by a controlling shareholder lacks asset lock-in, and limited
liability for shareholders encourages free transferability of shares. If shareholders were personally
liable for the corporation's acts, it would be much more difficult to develop an active market for
[Vol. 38:685
The Corporation As a Time Machine
corporations. Partnerships not only lack asset lock-in and perpetual life,
they also lack free transferability: the default rule is that a partner cannot
sell or transfer his or her interest in a partnership. Instead, when a partner
dies or withdraws, the partnership is terminated.4 6 But shareholders in
corporations typically can sell their shares to buyers who enjoy all the
legal rights to vote and to receive dividends enjoyed by the original
shareholder.4 7
This means that, even though a shareholder in a corporation is not
entitled to extract any of the corporation's assets directly from the corpo-
ration, she nevertheless may be able to convert her financial interest in
the company into cash by selling her shares to a new shareholder. Alt-
hough corporate assets are fixed and locked in, investor interests in cor-
porate shares can be relatively liquid. This liquidity finds its most perfect
expression in the case of shares of a large public corporation subject to
effective antifraud and disclosure rules that are listed for trading on an
organized, well-developed exchange. The market for shares of such cor-
porations is typically, to at least some degree, "fundamental value effi-
cient.",
48
Economists use the concept of fundamental value efficiency, which
plays a critical role in our analysis, to describe a market in which share
prices reflect the future expected economic returns (dividends and share
price appreciation) associated with owning the shares. 49 There are a
number of reasons to suspect most stock markets are not perfectly fun-
damental value efficient. For example, investors do not always have easy
access to the information they need to value shares, they do not always
shares, as potential buyers would want to have extensive information not only about the company
itself but about the wealth and creditworthiness of other shareholders. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41-43 (1991).
46. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 31 (1914).
47. It can remain difficult as a practical matter to sell shares in a private corporation that is not
traded on a well-developed exchange, and it is also not unusual for such companies to impose re-
strictions on the sale of shares to third parties. Thus, in private companies, altruism toward future
generations of shareholders may be the primary motivation for present-generation shareholders to
make very long-term investments.
48. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 560-61 (1984) (discussing market efficiency). Fundamental value effi-
ciency should be distinguished from informational efficiency. A market is said to be informationally
efficient when it is difficult to make a profit by trading on newly acquired information, because
market prices have already responded to that information. However, informational efficiency alone
does not imply that prices that respond quickly to information also necessarily provide an accurate
measure of fundamental economic value. Id. at 554-65 (distinguishing informational efficiency from
fundamental value efficiency).
49. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003).
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agree on how to interpret that information, and they may not always in-
terpret information rationally.5" Nevertheless, most experts believe that
the market for shares of large, publicly traded corporations subject to
antifraud and mandatory disclosure rules is to some degree fundamental
value efficient.5 1 As Nobel Prize-winning economist Fischer Black once
put it, modem stock markets are likely "efficient by a factor of 2," so that
"price is more than half of value and less than twice value. '5 2
To the extent the stock market is even somewhat fundamental value
efficient, the possibility arises that mortal human beings can use publicly
traded, for-profit corporations to transfer wealth not only from present
generations to future generations, but also from future generations to pre-
sent generations. The corporation now can transport wealth in both tem-
poral directions.
C. Transforming Future Returns into Present-Day Wealth
To understand this point, consider the perspective of a shareholder
in a corporation that is pursuing some long-term project (say, mining the
asteroid belt) unlikely to produce profits during the shareholder's re-
maining investing lifetime. If the shareholder cannot sell her shares, she
will attach no value to corporate profits likely to be earned only after she
has died or otherwise transferred share ownership.
But in a reasonably liquid and fundamental value efficient market,
the shareholder can sell her shares to a younger shareholder who places a
positive value on the future profits, because the younger shareholder ex-
pects to own the shares when the profits appear. Similarly, the younger
shareholder might value future profits likely to be earned after he has
transferred ownership, if he too anticipates he can sell his shares to an
even younger investor who will own the shares when profits finally start
rolling in.
And so on, ad infinitum. Through the vehicle of a public corpora-
tion whose shares are traded at prices reflecting future returns, profits
earned in the distant future can be transformed into wealth that can be
enjoyed today. For example, if Google's decision to invest in self-driving
cars increases today's price for Google stock, the present generation of
Google shareholders can hope to profit from Google's investment even if
50. Id. at 649, 660.
5 1. The U.S. Supreme Court recently subscribed to this view. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) ("[M]arket efficiency is a matter of degree." (citing Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988))).
52. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986).
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they do not expect to own Google shares when the technology becomes
commercially viable.
This transformation of future expected returns into present-day
wealth occurs to some extent even if equity markets are "noisy" and
prices do not perfectly capture expected future returns.5 3 A rough correla-
tion between price and value can still allow a present generation of
shareholders to capture much of the benefit of investing for the future.
For example, whether the market calculates the future benefits of self-
driving cars at $1 trillion or $2 trillion, the project remains attractive if
the initial investment required is a mere $100 billion. The public business
corporation's capacity to transform future profits into current share pric-
es does not need to be perfect for business corporations to perform the
function of shifting wealth backwards in time.54
D. Public Corporations Permit Efficient Intertemporal Exchange
This means that, once we create a corporation with asset lock-in,
perpetual life, and freely transferable shares traded in a reasonably effi-
cient market, we have created an institution that can operate as a fully-
functioning "wormhole" in time. Not only can the corporation convert
present wealth today into future profits that benefit future shareholders, it
can also transform those future profits into wealth that can be enjoyed by
present shareholders today, in the form of a higher share price.
The corporate form accordingly allows a type of implicit exchange
between different cohorts of human beings. A present generation that
might otherwise decline to make efficient investments that benefit future
generations becomes more willing to do so because the present genera-
tion is immediately compensated when expected future profits raise share
price. This clearly benefits the current generation. And, to the extent the
present generation of shareholders does not capture all the gains from
this intergenerational "trade"-perhaps because stock price does not cap-
ture all future profits, or because the project will provide external bene-
fits to nonshareholders like employees, customers, or tax-collecting gov-
ernments-future generations of shareholders and nonshareholders bene-
fit as well.
53. Id. at 529-30.
54. A noisy correlation between price and value does create the risk that, if the present genera-
tion of shareholders has the ability to unlock capital and extract assets from the corporation, they
will choose to exercise this ability in ways that defeat the corporation's ability to transfer resources
into and make investments for future generations. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this risk).
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The mechanism is unlikely to work perfectly. After all, the future is
uncertain. Projects that are economically desirable from an efficiency
perspective may not be pursued because the present generation of share-
holders does not expect all future benefits to be fully incorporated into
today's share price. 55 Alternatively, if the market overvalues a project, a
wasteful investment might be made that does not pan out.
56
Nonetheless, however imperfectly business corporations perform
their time-shifting function, having a dull knife is better than having no
knife at all. With even a flawed ability to transfer wealth backward in
time as well as forward, the public business corporation can help over-
come the limits of human altruism that otherwise cause present genera-
tions to systematically underinvest in the future. No longer must those
who will follow us depend only on the charity of those who walk the
planet today. The public corporation harnesses the self-interest of the
living to serve the interests of those not yet born. In doing so, it benefits
both groups, allowing present and future generations to participate in a
mutually beneficial intertemporal exchange of wealth that promotes both
intergenerational efficiency and intergenerational equity.
Of course, given the realities of risk and uncertainty, and the need
to discount future financial returns (if not future well-being)5 7 to present
value, intertemporal exchange may only be efficient for relatively rare,
long-term projects where present day investment will eventually produce
much larger future benefits. Such projects may be few and far between.
Yet as Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Solow has demonstrated,
they may also be disproportionately important to human progress and
prosperity.5 8 History offers many examples of transformational technolo-
gies-railroads, electric lighting, antibiotics, contraceptive pills, the tran-
sistor, the desktop computer-that required decades to develop and adapt
for commercial use, yet have since provided so many benefits to multiple
generations that from a social perspective they have paid for their initial
investment costs many times over. Only a little imagination is needed to
think of similar enterprises we might pursue today: extending the human
lifespan, developing algal biofuels, mining the asteroid belt. Business
corporations with asset lock-in, perpetual life, and efficiently traded
shares help overcome the limits to altruism that prevent us from pursuing
55. See infra Part IV.F (discussing market undervaluation).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 100-0 1 (discussing market overvaluation).
57. See supra note 42 (discussing whether future nonmonetary benefits should be discounted).
58. See Solow, supra note 41.
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such ideas.59 However imperfectly, the public corporation helps human
beings address at least some of the equity and efficiency problems asso-
ciated with their own mortality.
E. A Note on the Problem ofAgency Costs
Many readers may find the notion of corporate entities as vehicles
for transferring wealth between generations jarringly at odds with the
contemporary literature on the nature and purpose of corporations. In
part, this may be because academics share the natural human tendency to
pay attention mostly to the interests of the living. But it is also because
most contemporary corporate scholarship focuses on a problem orthogo-
nal to intergenerational equity and efficiency. This is the problem of
manager-imposed agency costs.
60
Corporate entities are real entities that exercise real influence.61 But
they exercise influence through human agents. Given the weaknesses of
human nature, it is only to be expected that corporate agents-in particu-
lar, corporate directors and executives-sometimes seek to serve their
62own interests rather than the entity's objectives. Modem corporate
scholarship focuses rather obsessively on this managerial "agency cost"
problem.63 Indeed, a casual reader could be forgiven for concluding that
the only problem posed by corporate entities is the challenge of eliminat-
ing the waste that results when corporate managers fail to run firms in an
optimal fashion (usually assumed to be a profit-maximizing fashion).64
59. In fact, present-day corporations are pursuing each of these projects. Human Longevity,
Inc. is seeking to combat aging. See HUMAN LONGEVITY INC., http://www.humanlongevity.com (last
visited Oct. 3, 2014). Synthetics Genomics is developing commercial algal biofuels. See SYNTHETIC
GENOMICS, http://www.syntheticgenomics.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). And Planetary Resources'
stated goal is asteroid exploration and mining. See PLANETARY RESOURCES,
http://www.planetaryresources.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
60. Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1908, 1913-17 (2013) (discussing "classic agency cost analysis"); see also Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (the most frequently cited article in the managerial literature);
ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM CAN LEARN
FROM THE NFL 11 (2011).
61. Even thoughtful observers sometimes describe corporations as "legal fictions." Any good
lawyer knows this phrase is an oxymoron. There is nothing fictional about legal institutions, which
exercise enormous influence over human beings. That corporations are invisible does not make them
fictional or unreal. Gravity, too, is invisible.
62. People asked to act as agents or fiduciaries tend to misbehave in one of two ways: they act
either foolishly or knavishly. The fiduciary duty of care addresses the first possibility; the duty of
loyalty addresses the second.
63. See Rock, supra note 60, at 1909 (describing how agency costs have been viewed as "the
central problem of U.S. corporate law").
64. See id. at 1911-17 (describing the "classic" shareholder-manager agency cost "paradigm").
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To someone who believes controlling manager-imposed agency
costs is the first and perhaps only policy priority in regulating corporate
entities, the idea of using business corporations to lock in wealth and
transfer it between generations may seem unwise. This is because corpo-
rate entities (including not only business corporations, which Blair and I
discuss at length in our 1999 article, but also nonprofits) typically
achieve lock-in by placing control of the entity's assets in the hands of a
board whose members are prohibited by the duty of loyalty from taking
the assets for themselves.65 Yet simply precluding directors from using
their corporate powers to enrich themselves does not leave them with
strong incentives to serve the corporation's interests. 66 Directors protect-
ed by the business judgment rule have ample room to shirk by devoting
inadequate time and attention to the corporate entity. 67 Accordingly, pub-
lic corporations governed by boards risk seeing their resources frittered
away. The only way to avoid such waste (or so the agency cost argument
typically goes) is to make directors "accountable" by making it easier for
shareholders to replace poorly performing boards, or tying director or
executive pay to some metric of shareholder returns.
68
At the outset, it is worth noting there seems no logical reason to as-
sume corporate assets paid out to directors, employees, or governments
in the form of fees, salaries, or taxes are somehow "wasted," while cor-
porate assets paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends or share
69repurchases are not. More important for present purposes, however, is
65. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 306. Although corporate law makes it difficult for direc-
tors to extract wealth from the corporation for themselves or their families, it is less effective at
preventing directors from using their powers to benefit friends or favorite employees (for example, a
popular CEO). This is another and perhaps inevitable source of managerial agency costs.
66. Id. The primary motivation for directors to do their best to serve corporate entities may be
some combination of the desire to keep the entity healthy so they can keep their board positions; the
desire to maintain and build their own status and reputations as business leaders; and the altruistic
desire to benefit the executives, employees, customers, and shareholders to whom they may feel a
sense of obligation. History has proven that this imperfect set of incentives can be sufficient to allow
board-controlled nonprofit and for-profit corporate entities to survive and thrive for decades and
even centuries, and play major roles in the global economy.
67. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6-9 (2003) (discuss-
ing effects of business judgment rule).
68. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that executive pay should be
tied to shareholder returns); Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 700-01 (2007) (arguing that shareholders should have more power to remove boards).
69. As David Ciepley has pointed out, any sophisticated discussion of agency costs in the
corporate context must address the question of who, exactly, is the principal and who is the agent.
See David Ciepley, The Corporation is Always Already Government-Supported, and So Is Bankrupt-
cy, II GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 367-69 (2013). Although modem scholars sometimes assume
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that asking managers to focus only on the interests of the current genera-
tion of shareholders may be a corporate cure far worse than the agency
cost disease. As discussed further below, if present-day shareholders are
given too much influence over corporate policies relating to distributions
of corporate assets, it can become difficult or impossible for corporations
to pursue long-term goals. Trying too hard to eliminate managerial agen-
cy costs can render public corporations unable to perform their most crit-
ical economic function. 0
The dilemma is similar to the quandary posed by light bulbs. Even
LED light bulbs waste enormous energy, with as much as 85% converted
to undesirable heat rather than light.7' If eliminating waste were our only
concern, we would turn off all light bulbs. But then we would be left to
sit in darkness. Similarly, a certain level of agency costs, possibly a very
high level, may be the price we must pay to reap the benefits of long-
term corporate investment.
This does not mean every enterprise requires a corporation. For
short-term projects promising modest benefits, the managerial agency
costs associated with using a public business corporation may be too
great to be worthwhile. Such projects should be pursued using other
business forms, like a partnership, or a corporation with a controlling
shareholder.72 But for large enterprises that must operate for long periods
of time in uncertain conditions to achieve potentially enormous benefits,
a high level of agency costs becomes acceptable. IBM and AT&T likely
shareholders are the principals in the corporation, this erroneous presumption ignores the signifi-
cance of legal personhood. See STOUT, supra note 21, at 42-44 (discussing why shareholders are not
principals). Legal personhood explains why directors and executives owe fiduciary duties not only to
shareholders and sometimes creditors, but to the corporate entity itself. Blair & Stout, supra note 5,
at 296 (discussing to whom fiduciary duties are owed). This perspective suggests that managers who
respond to shareholder pressure by disgorging corporate assets to current shareholders in a fashion
that interferes with the entity's long-term survival are imposing a kind of agency cost on the corpo-
rate entity. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 822-23 (making this argument). Future shareholders and
possibly future stakeholders may also be burdened. Id. Conversely, the managerial "empire build-
ing" many scholars view as an agency cost may be in the interests of the corporate entity and of
future generations, even if it is not always in the interests of the current generation of shareholders.
70. See infra Part IV (discussing this problem).
71. Fact or Fiction-LEDs Don't Produce Heat, LEDs MAGAZINE (May 2005),
http://www.ledsmagazine.com/articles/2005/05/fact-or-fiction-leds-don-t-produce-heat.html. Only
15% of the energy consumed by a typical LED bulb is used for visible light. Id. Incandescent bulbs
do much worse, converting only 5% of the energy used to light. Id.
72. Because they lack effective lock-in, corporations with controlling shareholders will likely
function well as vehicles for shifting wealth forward through time only when their controlling share-
holder is altruistic toward future generations. Even in such cases, there remains the problem of en-
suring that future controlling shareholders continue the altruistic, future-oriented plans of the origi-
nal controlling shareholder. See infra notes 119, 121, and accompanying text (discussing this prob-
lem).
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incurred very high levels of "wasteful" agency costs while operating
their Big Blue and Bell Labs research divisions during the 1950s and
1960s. Nevertheless, those costs have been repaid many times over by
the gains to multiple generations of shareholders (and others) from de-
veloping the computer and the transistor. Similarly, multiple future gen-
erations may benefit enormously from current corporate projects to de-
velop self-driving cars, commercial space transport, and algal biofuels.73
IV. THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE THINKING
A. Corporate Entities and Shareholder Primacy
Parts II and III of this Symposium Article have suggested that cor-
porations can be understood as immortal entities that pursue long-term,
open-ended projects that benefit multiple human generations. This per-
spective on the corporate form might feel familiar to an American CEO
in the twentieth century (or a bishop in the Middle Ages). Yet it may
look foreign to contemporary readers. This is because, for the past two or
three decades, most business experts have embraced a quite different
theory of the business corporation sometimes called shareholder prima-
cy.
74
Shareholder primacists typically view corporations not as entities
but as the property of the current generation of human beings who hold
their shares. 75 Because these present-day shareholders "own" the corpo-
ration, it is they-and not the company's board of directors-who de-
serve the final say on how corporate assets are used. The board is not
viewed as an independent body but as the agent of today's shareholders,
who tolerate board governance only to save themselves the bother of ex-
73. See, e.g., Clay Dillow, An Aggressive SpaceX Puts Commercial Space Rivals on Notice,
FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/08/26/an-aggressive-spacex-puts-commercial-
space-rivals-on-notice/; Michael Humphrey, Google Self-Driving Cars and All Tech: Are You Ready
to Give Up the Wheel?, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelhumphrey/
2014/08/25/google-self-driving-cars-and-all-tech-are-you-ready-to-give-up-the-whee/; Antonio
Regalado, Three Questions for J. Craig Venter, MIT TECH. REV. (July 30, 2014), http://www.techno
logyreview.com/news/529601/three-questions-for-j-craig-venter/. Interestingly, each of these corpo-
rations has found a way to protect itself from shareholder demands to unlock corporate assets.
Google has a dual class structure that disenfranchises its public shareholders, while SpaceX is pri-
vately owned by Elon Musk and Synthetic Genomics by Craig Venter.
74. For a fuller discussion of shareholder primacy's influence, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 449-51 (2001).
75. STOUT, supra note 21, at 37-38. The phrase "shareholder primacy" is misleading. Share-
holder primacy not only privileges shareholders' interests, but discounts all others'; "shareholder
absolutism" is a more accurate label. Moreover, shareholder primacy focuses on the interests of the
current generation of shareholders to the exclusion of future shareholders.
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pending their own time and energy on corporate affairs.7 6 In keeping
with the homo economicus model of neoclassical economic theory,
shareholders are assumed to want only more wealth. And in keeping with
the theory of efficient stock markets, today's share price is assumed to be
the most accurate measure of shareholder wealth.
Accordingly, shareholder primacy theory counsels that managers
ought to relentlessly "maximize shareholder value." As a practical mat-
ter, this translates to focusing on maximizing dividends and share price
appreciation, to the exclusion of other corporate concerns.
How does this business philosophy mesh with the idea of the corpo-
ration as a vehicle for the efficient intertemporal exchange of wealth be-
tween generations? The remainder of this Symposium Article explores
this question. As we shall see, if equity markets are perfectly fundamen-
tal value efficient, so that share prices accurately reflect the expected
future economic returns to holding shares, "maximizing shareholder val-
ue" does not necessarily threaten the corporate entity's capacity to effi-
ciently preserve and invest resources for future generations. But if-as
seems far more likely-stock markets are only somewhat efficient, tak-
ing a shareholder-centric 77 approach to corporate governance (the share-
holder in question being today's shareholder, not tomorrow's) may un-
dermine one of the most vital economic functions that business corpora-
tions perform.
B. The Rise of the American Public Corporation
Western law has provided for corporate entities with asset lock-in
and perpetual life since at least the Middle Ages.78 However, the publicly
traded business corporation is a relatively new invention that became
common in the United States after the turn of twentieth century. Its arri-
val on the economic scene was famously described by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means in their classic 1932 work, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.79 Berle and Means documented how gigantic, ex-
76. This view has been especially pressed by Stephen Bainbridge, who holds that corporations
ought to be run to maximize shareholder value but also argues that the best means to this end is to
insulate boards from shareholder control because shareholders are not in a good position to act col-
lectively or to know their own best interests. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 608-12 (2006). Bainbridge fails to explain why
corporate law does not allow shareholders to reclaim control over corporate decision making in cases
where the costs of becoming informed are extremely low and collective action is easy (for example,
voting whether to accept a buyout at a premium price).
77. I owe this useful phrase to Edward Rock. See Rock, supra note 60.
78. Ciepley explores still older, Roman origins. See Ciepley, supra note 28, at 7.
79. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 44.
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change-traded companies had come to dominate the U.S. economy. They
also pointed out how the widely dispersed shareholders in such compa-
nies faced collective action obstacles that left them nearly powerless to
use their already limited voting rights effectively. Authority over these
powerful new public corporations rested in the hands of a professional
class of executives and directors remarkably insulated from outside con-
trol .8
Managerial control kept public companies' assets firmly locked in.
Shareholders who were powerless to demand dividends or share repur-
chases, and who wanted to convert their interests in public companies
into cash, had but one realistic option: sell the shares to someone else.
Luckily, selling shares had become relatively easy thanks to the rise of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The passage of the Securities
Act of 1934, with its disclosure and antifraud rules, also made it more
likely shareholders could receive a decent price for their shares. 81 Thus
the emergence of a highly liquid and reasonably fundamental value effi-
cient secondary market meant that shareholders who wanted an immedi-
ate return on their investment had less need for dividends or share repur-
chase programs.
The twentieth century accordingly ushered in conditions highly fa-
vorable for creating business corporations that could not only shift
wealth forward in time, but also convert expected future wealth into a
higher share price today. As anticipated in Part III, this arrangement al-
lowed public corporations to undertake large-scale investment projects
over long periods of time under highly uncertain conditions. Firms like
IBM, GE, U.S. Steel, Kodak, Xerox, DuPont, and AT&T embarked on
intensive long-term research and development programs that eventually
produced groundbreaking innovations-the transistor, the desktop com-
puter, digital cameras-that often entered widespread commercial use
only after decades of work. These innovations have since provided incal-
culable benefits to both shareholders and society. For example, this
Symposium Article was written using voice recognition software, a po-
80. Berle and Means famously described public companies as having a "separation of owner-
ship and control." As Blair and I have pointed out, this phrase is misleading. Shareholders do not
own corporate entities but only own equity shares, which are a kind of contract between the share-
holder and the corporate entity. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 274 n.57. As legal entities, corpora-
tions "own" themselves. STOUT, supra note 21, at 38.
81. In the absence of effective antifraud rules, buyers discount the value of goods offered for
sale, depressing prices. See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS: READINGS AND EXERCISES 235 (Peter
Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1989).
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tentially transformative technology that IBM began working on in the
1960s but that only recently has become commercially viable.
82
Notably, the dominant business philosophy of twentieth-century
public companies was not shareholder primacy but "managerial capital-
ism," or more simply, "managerialism."8 3 Managerialist directors and
executives did not view themselves as servants of the company's current
shareholders. Rather, they saw themselves as trustees or stewards of
great economic institutions that had important public functions. 84 These
functions included not only providing returns to equity investors, but also
serving the needs of customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, and the
nation as a whole. In serving these interests, managers were free to focus
their attention not only on the present generation, but on future genera-
tions as well. Managerialism allowed public companies to be run with a
forward-looking focus that led to a wide variety of technological break-
throughs we still benefit from enormously today.
C. Shareholder Value Thinking Arrives
Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, American public
companies began to change. The shift began in academia with the rise of
the Chicago School of free market economists. 85 Influential economic
thinkers like Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen, apparently viewing
the public corporation rather like a gigantic sole proprietorship, argued
that the absence of shareholder power in public companies noted by
Berle and Means was a problem to be solved rather than a deliberate le-
gal strategy to achieve asset lock-in. 86 They erroneously described share-
holders as the "owners" and sole residual claimants of corporations. 87
They further assumed that shareholders wanted only to maximize
82. See Pioneering Speech Recognition, IBM, http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/
us/en/icons/speechreco/transform/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
83. See GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: How FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA
72-77 (2009) (discussing managerialist era).
84. Id. at 74-75.
85. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 216 (2008) (describing the influence of free market econo-
mists on the legal system).
86. STOUT, supra note 21, at 18. Berle and Means themselves did not share the view that the
separation of share ownership from control needed to be remedied. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, Signs of its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (In the Closet), 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1170-71 (2013).
87. Rather than owning corporations, shareholders own shares, which are a contract with the
corporate entity. Similarly, the corporate entity is its own residual claimant. STOUT, supra note 21, at
37-41. While the idea of shareholder "ownership" of the firm might be forgiven as a convenient and
harmless metaphor when describing a company with a controlling shareholder, it is grossly mislead-
ing when applied to a board-controlled company.
2015]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:685
"shareholder value," usually treated as synonymous with maximizing
dividends plus share price appreciation.88
This theoretical approach to understanding corporate entities led
many influential thinkers in the 1970s and 1980s to conclude that corpo-
rate projects that did not generate obvious and immediate financial re-
turns must be inefficient "empire building." 89 Shareholder powerlessness
in managerial firms was viewed as further evidence American corpora-
tions were broken and needed to be fixed. 90 Although remarkably little
hard data supported these claims,9' they were eagerly embraced by a ris-
ing generation of academics. They also appealed to a more powerful in-
terest group: the pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds that had
begun to dominate the stock market by the 1990s. Unlike disbursed and
passive retail investors, these institutional shareholders were large
enough to make meaningful attempts to influence board decisions, and
they saw opportunities to profit by pressuring boards to shift corporate
policy toward shareholder primacy.92
Shareholder primacy thinking began to influence federal law. In
1992, for example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
amended its proxy rules to promote "shareholder democracy" by giving
88. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 74. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this
assumption is tantamount to assuming that shareholders act like psychopaths who are indifferent to
the consequences that their investing decisions impose on others. STOUT, supra note 21, at 95-102.
89. See Rock, supra note 60, at 1915 (describing perceived problem of empire building).
90. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 68 (describing supposed problem of shareholder powerless-
ness). Ironically, while the idea that legislative intervention and central planning by academics can
produce better corporate governance rules than private contract and common law is associated with
economic analysis of corporate law, it is inconsistent with the Hayekian approach that the free mar-
ket economists who sparked the movement favored. Stout, supra note 86, at 1181.
91. Rock, supra note 60, at 121-22 (discussing empirical evidence); STOUT, supra note 21, at
34-47 (same); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2008 (2013) (same). The conventional wisdom that managerialist companies perform poorly
has little empirical support. Academics typically rely on the well-documented phenomenon that,
when a target company is sold or a conglomerate is broken up into several individual firms, share
price rises. However, this price rise is not accompanied by any evidence of improved operating
performance and is likely the result of the "winner's curse" commonly seen in auctions. Stout, supra.
Among laymen, shareholder primacy acquired emotional appeal in the 1980s as a result of a se-
vere bear market in the 1970s, along with the decline of the U.S. auto and steel industries. However,
the 1970s bear market was primarily due to the Arab oil embargo, which quadrupled the price of oil.
Stout, supra note 86, at 1172-75, 1178-81 (discussing 1970s bear market). Similarly, while the
struggles of the U.S. auto and steel industries are often cited as anecdotal evidence of the failures of
managerialism, this explanation seems weak because managerialist firms dominated the U.S. econ-
omy for decades before the auto and steel industries ran into trouble. A better explanation may be the
rise of too-powerful labor unions in those industries that were able to unlock corporate assets for
their own benefit. See supra notes 18-19 (discussing problem of stakeholders unlocking corporate
assets).
92. Rock, supra note 60, at 1922-23.
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shareholders greater freedom to coordinate proxy campaigns, opening
the door for the emergence of the activist hedge fund.93 An even more
important change came in 1993, when Congress amended the tax code to
require companies to tie top executives' pay to objective performance
measures in order to gain full tax deductibility. 94 In keeping with share-
holder value thinking, share price became the popular metric and stock
options the favorite form of compensation, with the eventual result that
CEOs now have most of their income and personal wealth tied to share
price performance.95 Meanwhile, activist investors and other shareholder
privacy advocates pushed companies to adopt governance practices that
made boards more sensitive to shareholder demands, such as majority
voting rules in director elections and "destaggered" board structures.96
Such changes in law and practice ensured that, by the close of the
twentieth century, shareholder value thinking had replaced
managerialism as the dominant business philosophy in public corpora-
tions. In the words of influential corporate scholar Edward Rock: "Man-
agers now largely think and act like shareholders. 97 (For "shareholders,"
read "today's shareholders, who care only about their own material
wealth.") Directors and executives now often run public companies with
a single goal in mind: maximizing shareholder value.
D. Shareholder Value Thinking with Perfectly Efficient Markets
How has the shift from managerialism to shareholder primacy af-
fected the public corporation's ability to efficiently transfer wealth back
93. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 1255, 1274-83 (2008) (discussing this and other legal changes that have empowered institu-
tional shareholders).
94. Stout, supra note 86, at 1176 (discussing tax code change).
95. Rock, supra note 60, at 1924.
96. A classic example of the influence of shareholder value thinking on corporate practice is
the modem practice of "destaggering" corporate boards so that companies become more vulnerable
to hostile takeover bids. This trend did not emerge organically from the business world but was
driven by an academic policy initiative associated with a law professor, Lucian Bebchuk. See Steven
Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards (describing trend toward
destaggering and role of Harvard governance project). A second outside force that has pushed com-
panies to destagger their boards is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a company that advises
mutual and pension funds how to vote the shares in their portfolios. Id. ISS is notorious both for its
lack of accountability and for the lack of empirical evidence to back up its recommendations. See
generally Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for
Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 384 (2009) (critiquing ISS); see also
Robert M. Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J.
FIN. ECON. 439 (2010) (same).
97. Rock, supra note 60, at 1988.
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and forth between different generations of shareholders? To address this
question, let us start by assuming, rather unrealistically, that stock mar-
kets are perfectly fundamental value efficient. In other words, assume
today's stock price always perfectly captures the discounted present val-
ue of all future economic returns not only to the company's current gen-
eration of shareholders, but to all its future shareholders as well.
As explored earlier, perfectly fundamental value efficient stock
markets fully compensate current shareholders for corporate investments
that eventually produce returns exceeding their costs-even if those re-
turns come after today's shareholders have died or sold their shares. Thus
efficient stock markets give today's shareholders incentives to support
efficient corporate investment in the future. A corollary is that giving
today's shareholders more power over boards of directors, or tying exec-
utive pay to shareholder returns, becomes less likely to harm the public
company's ability to serve future generations." By tempering agency
costs, it may even help.
But as already noted, it is unrealistic to assume stock markets are
always perfectly fundamental value efficient. What happens if markets
are only sometimes, or only somewhat, efficient? What is the result if, as
seems highly likely, share prices occasionally undervalue or overvalue
future retums?99
E. Shareholder Value Thinking with Imperfectly Efficient Markets
When stock markets are imperfectly efficient, shareholder prima-
cy's tenets that shareholders need power over boards, and that managers
need incentive to maximize shareholder value, begin to cause problems.
Those problems, moreover, are asymmetrical: a market that undervalues
a company's stock is likely to produce more negative efficiency conse-
quences than a market that overvalues that stock.
To see why, imagine there is an inefficient bubble for a company's
stock-the price for shares exceeds the value of likely future returns
from dividends and share price appreciation. Such overvaluation can re-
sult in the misallocation of resources when the company issues new
shares to investors because the funds the company raises would be better
98. Perfectly fundamental value efficient markets still do not solve the problem of corporate
externalities, or the possibility of ex post shareholder opportunism that Blair and I explored in A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. See supra note 5. It should also be noted that tying
executive pay to shareholder returns does not necessarily serve shareholders' pro-social interests.
See STOUT, supra note 21, at 96-101 (discussing the likelihood that nonpsychopathic shareholders
care about more than financial performance).
99. See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing market inefficiency).
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invested elsewhere. But because corporations issue new equity so rarely,
misallocations in the primary market are unlikely to be a serious eco-
nomic problem.'00 Most of the time, stock overpricing only affects sec-
ondary market trading, causing investors purchasing shares to transfer
some of their wealth unnecessarily to investors selling shares. This redis-
tributes wealth among investors, but does not systemically misallocate
resources.101
The situation is more troubling when the market undervalues com-
panies. Like overpricing, underpricing in the primary market for shares
misallocates resources (although instead of investors' funds being wasted
on less desirable corporate projects, now good projects go begging). But
again, corporations rarely use the primary market. The greater economic
problem is underpricing in the secondary market. Unlike secondary mar-
ket overpricing, which mostly just transfers wealth, secondary market
underpricing threatens serious resource allocations. This is because, as
explored below, secondary market underpricing can give a corporation's
current shareholders reason to try to unlock corporate assets that effi-
ciency demands should stay committed to long-term corporate projects.
F. Cutting Corporate Oaks
To understand the perverse incentives secondary market underpric-
ing creates for shareholders to unlock corporate assets, consider the di-
lemma a shareholder faces when the stock market undervalues her
shares. The shareholder may believe the market will eventually come to
correctly price the company's stock. But when? The market may not cor-
rect itself until after she has sold her shares. This is especially likely in
today's world of low trading costs and high turnover, where the average
holding period for shares listed on U.S. exchanges is only four months.'0 2
In periods of market undervaluation, it may no longer make sense
for shareholders to support long-term corporate projects. Because the
market discounts the value of future profits, shareholders who plan to sell
100. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 644-49 (1988) (discussing relative
unimportance of secondary stock market in allocating economic resources).
101. Id. For a contrary view, see Michael Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and
the Current State of Corporate Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549 (2004) (arguing that secondary
market inefficiency leads executives whose compensation is based on equity prices to manipulate
prices or even commit fraud). It can be argued, however, that in such cases the fault lies less in an
inefficient market and more in the use of stock-based compensation. See Lynn A. Stout, Killing
Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of "Pay-for-Performance', 39 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2014) (discussing dangers of "pay for performance" approach).
102. STOUT, supra note 21, at 66.
2015]
Seattle University Law Review
soon may calculate that they would do better if such projects were aban-
doned and the resources devoted to them were used elsewhere or, better
yet, sold for cash that could be distributed as a dividend. In extreme cas-
es, shareholders might want the entire company sold or liquidated.
As a hypothetical example, recall the oak groves of New College
discussed in Part II.H. New College is, of course, a nonprofit. But sup-
pose New College were a for-profit business corporation with sharehold-
ers. Suppose also that at some periods in its long history, shares of hypo-
thetical New College Corp. traded at depressed prices. During these peri-
ods of depressed prices, shareholders in New College Corp. who wanted
to sell in the near future might reasonably have concluded that the best
way to maximize their wealth would be to have New College Corp. cut
down its oaks, sell them for timber, and distribute the cash from the sale
in a dividend. This would have been a regrettable mistake from the per-
spectives of New College and its future shareholders, who want the oaks
to be available when dining hall repairs become necessary in the future.
But the state of the dining hall decades or centuries hence would be of no
concern to New College shareholders planning to sell undervalued shares
in the near future.
G. The Downside of Shareholder Value Thinking
Of course, if New College Corp. were a board-managed company
with effective lock-in, decisions about what to do with the oak groves
and whether or not to pay dividends would not have been made by its
shareholders. They would have been made by its board of directors. And
unlike New College Corp.'s shareholders, the members of the board
would not have gained financially from cutting down the oaks, even at
times when the market undervalued New College Corp. shares."°3 As a
result, while the board of New College Corp. controlled the oak groves,
the oaks would have been at far less risk of being cut down before their
time. 104
The example of New College Corp. illustrates how managerialist
companies governed by boards are less likely to terminate long-term cor-
porate projects prematurely. However, shareholders in public companies
today enjoy far more influence over boards than they enjoyed in the
managerialist era. Executive compensation practices have also changed,
103. Although directors who are also shareholders may hope to profit from "unlocking share-
holder value" by cutting down the oaks, directors' fees in and of themselves typically are not tied to
share price performance.
104. To the contrary, directors' incentives favor pursuing the project. See supra note 66 (dis-
cussing directors' incentives and motivations).
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and executives' financial incentives are much closer to shareholders'.
Logic suggests such shifts make it harder for public corporations to keep
their assets locked in. And, unless stock markets are perfectly fundamen-
tal value efficient-which is unlikely for the reasons discussed in Part
III.B-loss of asset lock-in threatens public companies' ability to pursue
long-term projects.
Without lock-in, public corporations become delicate creatures. All
it takes is a market that temporarily undervalues the company's shares,
and shareholders who plan to sell in the near future may ask the board to
abandon long-term plans and instead pursue strategies calculated to pro-
duce immediate share price gains. For example, shareholders may ask
boards to cut expenses for marketing, research, and employee develop-
ment; take on debt to fund a large dividend or share repurchase program;
or even sell off all or part of the company. Moreover, even if a compa-
ny's existing shareholders are patient, an undervalued firm risks attract-
ing unwanted attention from short-term investors, like hedge funds, that
can buy on the open market for the sole purpose of pressuring boards to
pursue such measures. 05 Finally, even if the board is willing and able to
resist activist shareholder demands, executives whose wealth and income
are tied to shareholder returns may themselves lobby the board to chase
short-term price appreciation rather than long-term growth.
With such powerful constituents pushing boards to "unlock share-
holder value," it becomes far more difficult for public corporations to
pursue long-term projects. After all, long-term projects by definition re-
quire years or decades to reach fruition. Without asset lock-in, a single
period of significant share undervaluation during those years or decades
may derail the project. Knowing this, directors and executives of public
companies without effective lock-in will likely avoid making long-term
investments in the first place.' 0 6 The eventual result is reduced returns for
future generations of shareholders.
Recognizing the public business corporation's role as an institution
for efficient intertemporal exchange of resources between generations
offers a new perspective on the wisdom of embracing "shareholder de-
mocracy" and "maximizing shareholder value" as corporate objectives.
105. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401
(2007) ("Activist hedge funds look for four things in their targets-potential sale of the whole, po-
tential sale of a part, free cash, and cuttable costs.").
106. As an example, Exxon Mobil was initially interested in developing algal biofuels. How-
ever, it dropped the project when it concluded that it was likely twenty-five years or more away from
commercial viability. Joe Carroll, Exxon at Least 25 Years Away from Making Fuel from Algae,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2013, 1:l 1 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/exxon-at-least-
25-years-away-from-making-fuel-from-algae.html.
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Whether or not the embrace of shareholder primacy has benefited today's
shareholders by reducing managerial agency costs-and given continued
growth in executive compensation in the face of weak shareholder re-
turns, there is every reason to question whether it has' 7 -shareholder
primacy may have a much larger economic cost if it destroys the public
corporation's ability to invest efficiently in the future.
H. Signs of Trouble
Unfortunately, there are signs the destruction has begun. These
signs include (1) the prevalence of corporate share repurchases over
share issuances; (2) a decline in the population and life expectancy of
public corporations; (3) reduced returns to equity investors in public cor-
porations; and (4) expressions of concern that American public compa-
nies are becoming less innovative. Let us consider each in turn.
In the managerialist era, boards and executives often embraced
growth as a corporate objective. 1 8 With today's emphasis on "unlocking
shareholder value," many American companies have adopted the oppo-
site strategy. Rather than accumulating resources, they are now unlock-
ing assets and distributing cash to shareholders. This trend can be seen
when we compare corporate issuances with corporate share repurchases.
From 1993 on, American nonfinancial companies have routinely dis-
gorged $50 to $200 billion more in cash annually to shareholders through
repurchase programs than they have raised through equity issuances. 0 9
This conservative figure excludes corporate cash disgorged to sharehold-
ers through dividends.
If these cash transfers to shareholders are being made at the expense
of retaining adequate corporate resources to protect against downside
risk and invest for the future, they make it harder for American public
companies to survive and thrive. Supporting this hypothesis, American
public companies are becoming both fewer and more fragile. Over the
last fifteen years the population of U.S. listed firms has dropped by more
than half, from nearly 9,000 firms in the late 1990s to only around 4,000
107. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 68, at 1-22 (discussing strong growth in executive
compensation over the past two decades); see also infra text accompanying note 113 (discussing
declining investor returns over the past two decades).
108. Indeed, shareholder primacists cited such "empire building" as a flaw of managerialism.
Rock, supra note 60, at 1915.
109. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE BD., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 14 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/
february/ReportSection2.htm (referencing table entitled "financing gap and net equity retirement at
nonfinancial corporations"). See also Rock, supra note 60, at 1919 (noting that from 1984 to 1990,
about 3% of net public equity was returned each year, with this trend continuing into 2000s).
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today. 10 Meanwhile, the life expectancy of large companies has been cut
by more than 75%. In the mid-twentieth century, the average Fortune
500 company could expect to remain on that list for sixty years or more.
Today the average Fortune 500 firm stays in the 500 for only fifteen
years. 1'
If public companies today are in fact emphasizing short-term share
price gains at the expense of long-term investment, we also can expect to
see, in due time, reduced returns to investors. Again, this seems to be
happening. Shareholder value thinking gained serious legal traction in
the early 1990s with the SEC's 1992 proxy rule amendments (which
paved the way for activist institutional investors) and Congress' 1993 tax
code change (which encouraged executive pay to be tied to share
price). 112 In the years immediately following, shareholders in public
companies saw an initial increase in their returns. So too would hypothet-
ical shareholders of New College Corp. if they owned undervalued
shares at a time when its oaks were cut down and sold for timber. But
even including gains from the late 1990s bull market, returns from hold-
ing public equity have been significantly lower in the shareholder-centric
era than under managerialism. During the four decades from 1954 to
1993, inflation-adjusted total returns to holding the S&P 500 averaged
7% annually. In the two decades since, shareholders have done signifi-
cantly worse, earning average inflation-adjusted returns of only 6.5%
annually. 113
It can of course be argued that declining shareholder returns are due
to some cause other than the business world's embrace of shareholder
primacy. Yet in addition to the objective facts-massive share repur-
chase programs, declining numbers of public companies, reduced corpo-
rate life span, diminished investor returns-there is a widespread subjec-
110. Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 4 POL. & Soc'Y 283, 291 (2013) (Fig. 2, U.S.
Listed Companies).
111. Steve Denning, Peggy Noonan on Steve Jobs and Why Big Companies Die, FORBES (Nov.
19, 2011, 7:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/19/peggy-noonan-on-steve-
jobs-and-why-big-companies-die/. See generally The Endangered Public Company, THE
ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21555562. Before dismissing the
disappearance of public companies as evidence of Schumpeterian "creative destruction," it is im-
portant to recognize that if the destruction were creative it should be generating higher returns to
shareholders. See infra text accompanying note 113 (equity returns are declining).
112. See Stout, supra note 86, at 1176 (discussing change to tax code); see also Anabtawi &
Stout, supra note 93, at 1276-77 (discussing change to proxy rule).
113. This calculation can be performed using the Dow Jones total return S&P 500 calculator,
available at http://dqydj.net/sp-500-return-calculator/, and calculating total inflation adjusted returns
with dividends reinvested from January of 1954 until December of 1993, and from January of 1994
until December of 2013.
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tive perception that U.S. corporations are no longer pursuing the sorts of
transformative research projects that were the hallmark of great Ameri-
can companies during the twentieth century. Companies like AT&T, GE,
Kodak, Xerox, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, and U.S. Steel used to main-
tain large divisions devoted to research with little immediate commercial
application. Today, the great corporate research labs of the managerialist
era have become shadows of their former selves as employees are cut
and the focus is shifted from pure research to modest projects with im-
mediate profit potential." 4 Where in the 1950s American corporations
retained 60% of their profits for research and development, today they
retain less than 10%."' Companies that attempt to build cash cushions to
fund large-scale future projects are targeted by activist hedge funds de-
manding the cash be distributed to shareholders today.16
Logic and empirical data both support the claim that shareholder
primacy threatens the public corporation's ability to invest for future
generations. If further evidence is desired, consider a prominent counter-
example: Google. In the spirit of the great twentieth century American
corporations, Google is boldly pursuing large research projects devoted
to developing robots and self-driving cars." 7 Google can do this despite
today's shareholder value ideology because, unlike most contemporary
Fortune 500 firms, its assets are strongly locked in. When Google went
public, it used a "dual class" share structure that allowed its founders and
top executives to keep voting control." 18 Google's outside shareholders
are arguably even more powerless than the disbursed individual share-
holders of the managerialist era.
Adopting a dual class structure like Google's is not a realistic op-
tion for most existing public companies." 9 But Google's example, to-
114. See, e.g., Bill Buxton, The Price of Forgoing Basic Research, BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 17,
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-12-17/the-price-of-forgoing-basic-research
businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; The Rise and Fall of Corporate
R&D: Out of the Dusty Labs, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/
8769863.
115. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 149 (2013) (citing remarks of Jack Jacobs).
116. See, e.g., Ray Tiernan, Activist Icahn Oversteps with Apple Buyback Demand, BARRON'S
(Oct. 26, 2013), http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB500014240531119048971045791494919
09420008. Icahn is only one of several activists that have targeted Apple.
117. See Berr, supra note 36; see also Humphrey, supra note 73.
118. See Stout, supra note 86, at 1182 (discussing Google).
119. Moreover, dual class structures raise their own problems. For example, it is unclear how a
dual class company can maintain its forward-looking focus when its original controlling sharehold-
ers and executives die or retire. A similar problem can be seen in family-controlled firms, which are
especially common outside the United States. Questions of succession and legacy loom large and
threaten the long-term survival of the corporate entity when control of a family corporation passes
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gether with the observation that the relatively few companies that do go
public today increasingly prefer dual class structures, suggests that entre-
preneurs and business people recognize that public corporations run ac-
cording to the principles of shareholder primacy are fragile and dysfunc-
tional entities, incapable of pursuing long-range plans. Shareholder value
thinking appears toxic to many, and perhaps most, public corporations.
120
V. CONCLUSION
Modem discussions of corporate governance tend to implicitly as-
sume that the question of how to best organize and govern corporations
should be viewed from the perspective of what best serves the interests
of today's shareholders (if one is a shareholder primacy advocate) or to-
day's shareholders and other "stakeholders" (if one subscribes to some
variant of stakeholder theory). Yet in thinking about how corporations
contribute to social welfare, there is no reason we must consider only the
welfare of those currently alive. Other generations can count, too. And
while we cannot do much to benefit the dead, by using the corporate
form we may be able to benefit not only those who are living, but also
those who will live in the future.
This Symposium Article has suggested that the corporate form can
be understood as a legal technology that has functioned historically as a
vehicle for transferring wealth forward in time to benefit future genera-
tions. More recently, one kind of corporation-the public business cor-
poration-has also developed the capacity to transfer wealth that will be
created in the future backward in time to the present, where it appears as
a higher share price today. This ability to transfer wealth in both tem-
poral directions encourages investment in very large scale, very long-
term enterprises.1 21 And very large-scale, long-term enterprises are of
enormous significance to human welfare.
into the hands of a third or fourth generation. The great success of twentieth-century American cor-
porations compared to those of other nations suggests that public companies run by managerialist
boards whose members are selected for qualities like character, reputation, and the desire to leave a
legacy may be superior at pursuing long-range investment plans to family-controlled companies
where control is determined by genetic lottery. See STOUT, supra note 21, at 56; see also Stout,
supra note 67, at 20-23 (2003) (discussing director selection). Public ownership structures also have
the advantage of allowing the general population to participate in the wealth generation made possi-
ble by corporate entities.
120. See generally Stout, supra note 86 (discussing toxic effects of shareholder value think-
ing).
12 1. This may explain why there are relatively few publicly traded corporations. See supra text
accompanying note 110 (about 4000 public companies in the United States). By contrast there are
several million private companies that file corporate tax returns. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 491 (2012), available at
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One implication is that if the corporate form in general, and the
public business corporation in particular, had never developed, the pre-
sent generation of human beings likely would be far worse off than they
are today. Of course, creating an immortal entity capable of accumulat-
ing enormous resources, and granting it legal and political rights, raises
"Frankenstein's monster" issues that must be taken seriously. We do not
want the corporate creation to destroy the creator.122 Such issues lie be-
yond the scope of this Symposium Article, but they are important and
should be addressed. Yet history demonstrates that corporations have
great potential to do good for humanity. Without corporations, fewer
universities would have been founded and fewer cathedrals built, and
fewer still would have survived to delight, inspire, and educate multiple
generations. We would have far fewer roads, canals, and railroads, and
thus less commerce and exchange. We would probably not enjoy the
benefits of the transistor, computer, commercial aviation, readily availa-
ble antibiotics and antivirals, or the Interet-at least not unless such
innovations were developed and provided solely by government entities,
an unlikely scenario in a capitalist democracy.1
23
A second implication is that, if we do not continue to have thriving
corporations, and especially thriving business corporations with asset
lock-in and transferable shares, future generations will be left worse off
than they could, or should, be. Our society confronts a variety of serious
problems likely to be solved only by investing massive amounts of re-
sources over long periods of time: disappearing ecosystems, increasing
http://www.census.gov/prod/20l1 pubs/I 2statab/business.pdf (specifically Table 744, Number of Tax
Returns, Receipts, and Net Income by Type of Business: 1990-2008, indicating 5.8 million corpo-
rate tax returns for 2008). Because many private companies have a controlling shareholder, they
have only a limited capacity to aggregate and lock in assets, suggesting there is some reason other
than scale and longevity why their founders are choosing the corporate form. Limited shareholder
liability is one obvious explanation.
122. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part) (describing the corporation as a "Frankenstein monster which states have created by their cor-
poration laws").
123. See supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing obstacles to long-term government
investment in a capitalist democracy). Like corporations, governments are "sempitemal" entities that
have the potential to pursue long-term projects through multiple generations of human agents. Alt-
hough an exploration of the complex relationship between corporations and governments lies well
beyond the scope of this Symposium Article, see, e.g., Ciepley, supra note 28 (arguing that the idea
of government has roots in corporate concepts) and Ciepley, supra note 115 (arguing that modem
business corporations can be viewed as "franchise governments"), it should be noted that while
public business corporations can substitute for governments in pursuing long-term investments,
governments and business corporations can also play complementary roles. For example, while the
Federal government decided to build and provide funding for the Hoover Dam in the 1930s, the dam
itself was constructed by for-profit entities. See generally MOWERY & ROSENBERG, supra note 35
(discussing combined roles of corporations, governments, and universities in fostering innovation).
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demands for energy, chronic diseases like diabetes and hypertension,
rising carbon levels in our atmosphere and our oceans. Corporations in
general, and particularly public business corporations with asset lock-in,
are especially well suited to solving such long-term problems.
If we care about intergenerational equity and intergenerational effi-
ciency, we should protect and preserve the legal invention known as the
corporation. Nonprofit entities seem to be doing at least as well as they
historically have done. But the picture is not so rosy when it comes to
public business corporations. There is reason to suspect that, as a result
of widespread misunderstanding of their nature and purpose, large public
corporations are becoming an endangered species. Their decline poses a
challenge to our own species as well.

